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I expected to be going over more of what’s been happening in railroading in general, not discussing another fatal Amtrak crash, the third in less than a month. It happened early Sunday, February 4, 2018.
As reported by USA Today, it appears that this one killed the Amtrak engineer and conductor and injured 116 people, two critically. The crash occurred in darkness, at 2:35am near Cayce, North Carolina, just south of the state capital. The Amtrak train, southbound from New York to Florida, appears to have hit the rear, unoccupied distributed power unit of a stopped CSX freight on CSX track.
There are other reports that say signals had been taken out of service for maintenance and that the Amtrak train had been given verbal orders to occupy the section of track.
Every article I have been able to find that covers this crash cites the fact that PTC (Positive Train Control) would have prevented this crash. My first reaction to those statement is this: Not if the signal system was taken out of service. Logically, that would mean that the PTC was down as well. I know that PTC can operate independently of signal systems, but no railroad that has signals reports that it will separate the two upon implementation of PTC. Some railroads may shut down signals in the future, once PTC has been tested and certified safe and fully functional.
Even with fully functional PTC, which we appear to be some way from to date, there will be times when the system is down for maintenance. Those who think otherwise need to look at the best computer network to which they have been exposed, either on the job or elsewhere, and decide whether it is one that has never been down for maintenance.
If you are looking for a cause, perhaps look to CSX Transportation. Bloomberg Markets reported two days ago that CSX’s accident rate, as keyed to train-miles, has been rising for the past three years. CSX has been in turmoil as its new CEO, E. Hunter Harrison, as attempted fast implementation of his system of Precision Scheduled Railroading, drawing complaints and ire from shippers and some regulators. CSX controls the switch that now, as reported on Sunday, February 4, 2018, by the NTSB, is thought to be the reason Amtrak was on the wrong track.
(As of this morning, February 6, both the NTSB and Amtrak have concluded that CSX lined the switch for the siding and padlocked it. This suggests a high level of CSX agency in the crash, as well as some questions as to whether this switch was being operated manually because of the signal outage, or whether it is always a manual switch. If the latter, then CSX and its personnel had even a higher duty to see that the switch was aligned for the main (and for the Amtrak train) in my opinion. Someone on the ground lined that switch the wrong way.)
Imagine being the engineer of the Amtrak, told by train order that you are cleared to proceed at track speed, unable to determine whether the track is clear any other way (signals were not functional). He or she was basically driving the train in “dark territory,” a railroad term for unsignaled track where other, long-tested systems (train orders) have been used for years to assure against collisions. Under a train order or similar operating system, whoever lined the switch had a duty to inform the dispatcher and make sure the dispatcher that allowed Amtrak to proceed understood the switch alignment. As the investigation proceeds, we'll have to see if the Amtrak engineer was told by the CSX dispatcher to stop and reset the switch for the main line.
You don’t line a manual switch in train order territory without making sure it is under orders and/or any deviations are understood by ALL parties so trains in the territory can be stopped, if necessary. When somebody drops the ball or makes a mistake, collisions happen. (We still don't know where the crew of the CSX freight was located. Was there, or was there supposed to be, a person on the ground to reset the switch? Had the crew left the train completely? Under what circumstances? Many other questions.)
Does Amtrak have any blame? As things have evolved, Amtrak has very little say in how the freight railroads meet their obligation to handle Amtrak trains. At the beginning of Amtrak, it was generally thought that the agreements made by the railroads in return for allowing them to drop any responsibility for operating their own passenger systems would cause the railroads to prioritize Amtrak trains and the safety of Amtrak passengers. Not so today, although I would not go as far as saying that the freight railroads don’t care about safety.
Could the Amtrak engineer have refused to enter “dark territory?” That’s something we, unfortunately, can’t ask the engineer. I will say that railroaders are a fearless and trusting lot. They have to be. Much rides on their ability to do their jobs while trusting many complicated systems, mechanical, electronic, and human, to keep them from figuratively driving a train off the edge of a cliff. I don’t think the engineer gave it a second thought when and if the engineer was told the track was clear.
©2018 – C. A. Turek – mistertrains@gmail.com
(Charles A. Turek is a writer and novelist based in Albuquerque, NM. After four decades working in areas of the insurance industry related to transportation, he now writes on all aspects of American railroading. Charles is a political conservative but believes in public funding of passenger rail as a part of the federal government’s constitutionally conservative obligation to provide for defense and public infrastructure so that private enterprise may flourish.)
